Timing Analysis of SSL/TLS Man in the Middle Attacks by Benton, Kevin & Bross, Ty
Timing Analysis of
SSL/TLS Man in the
Middle Attacks
Kevin Benton, Ty Bross INFO I-521: Spring 2012
Abstract
M
an in the middle attacks are a signif-
icant threat to modern e-commerce
and online communications, even
when such transactions are protected by TLS.
We intend to show that it is possible to de-
tect man-in-the-middle attacks on SSL and
TLS by detecting timing differences between
a standard SSL session and an attack we cre-
ated.
Introduction
A man-in-the-middle attack is one in which an ad-
versary places himself between legitimate users, mas-
querading as each of the legitimate users when com-
municating with the other. The SSL/TLS version of
this is as follows:
Figure 1: Man in the Middle attack
1. Alice tries to start an SSL handshake with Bob
but the connection is intercepted by Mallory
2. Mallory starts her own SSL session with Bob
3. Mallory generates and sends a certificate that
appears to be from Bob
4. If Alice accepts the certificate, she establishes
an SSL sesion using Mallory’s key
5. Messages from Alice are decrypted by Mallory
and then sent over the SSL session she estab-
lished with Bob
6. Mallory can now relay messages between the SSL
sessions while examining/modifying the plain-
text data
The obvious issue above is that Alice accepted the
certificate from Mallory that impersonated Bob. The
public key infrastructure was designed to prevent
this by having some trusted certificate authority
authenticate and sign certificates to show that the
subject in the certificate is the only entity that has
the private key that goes with it. However, there are
several issues (discussed below) that make the PKI
much less trustworthy than originally intended.
Our goal is to look at SSL man-in-the-middle at-
tacks from a network traffic perspective to see if
certain behaviors give away an attack. More specif-
ically, we perform a timing analysis to determine
if the attacker’s certificate generation phase can be
detected due to long response times after starting
the SSL handshake.
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Background
The Stevens et al. demonstrated a collision attack
that exploited the weakness of MD5 to generate an
unauthorized valid intermediary CA certificate[12].
They did this first by getting a regular server certifi-
cate from a trusted CA. Since the signature scheme
was MD5, they were able to find a collision with a
certificate they generated that had signing privileges.
Since the signatures were the same MD5 hash, it
effectively became an intermediary CA certificate
signed by the original CA. This certificate could then
be use to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks that
would pass the PKI validation.
Moxie Marlinkspike introduced an interesting
vulnerability in the way that browsers (used to)
handle null termination characters that appear in
certificates[10]. He found that some certificate au-
thorities would allow him to put a null character
in the subject field of the certificate. Therefore, a
request could be made for bank.com
0.attacker.com and the authority would correctly
verify that he owned attacker.com (since it’s the par-
ent domain) and issue the certificate. Then, due to
browser implementations at the time, they would
stop at the null char and accept the certificate as
though it were for bank.com. It even worked with
wildcards, so an attacker could get a cert for *
0.attacker.com and browsers would treat it as a cer-
tificate for * (all domains), allowing it to be used to
impersonate any website.
Current certificate stores trust many authorities
and very few users actually check to see which au-
thorities are trusted by their browser. There are
various conditions where an additional CA could be
added to the trust list without the user noticing[1].
This could be done by malicous adversaries via mal-
ware, or it could simply be done by the entity in
charge of maintaining the computer. In either case,
man-in-the-middle attacks can use the certificate to
conduct ”PKI-valid” man-in-the-middle attacks.
Like any other institutions, certificate authorities
have to answer to the government of the country in
which they operate. They could be required to just
give a valid signing certificate to law enforcement
agencies for wiretapping. Devices created specifically
for this purpose were leaked to the public[2], showing
that these attacks occur often enough to warrant
special hardware. Finally, certificate authorities can
simply be hacked and have their certificates stolen,
as was the case with DigiNotar[16].
Even with the high theoretical security of the PKI,
all of these attacks show that the current structure is
vulnerable to political pressures and suffers from the
problem where the weakest link breaks the whole sys-
tem due to browsers trusting all authorities equally.
Although certificate revokation mechanisms help with
a lot of these problems, [10] demonstrated that many
browsers do not strictly enforce revokation checks so
they can be blocked or responded to with an error
code. This motivated us to look at other methods of
detecting SSL MiTM attacks.
Experimental Design
To measure the behavior of normal SSL handshakes
compared to ones conducted with MiTM attackers,
we wrote a program that starts an SSL handshake
and then closes the connection after receiving the
certificate from the remote party. It measures the
time it takes for the TCP connection to be estab-
lished and the time it takes for the remote party to
reply with a certificate. Due to the nature of certain
MiTM attacks generating certificates in real-time
after connecting to the real target, the gap between
when the connection is established and when the cer-
tificate is received should widen significantly under
the attack condition.
Since the gap between the handshake hello and the
server certificate includes network transport time, we
subtract out an RTT to account for this. We roughly
estimate the RTT by averaging the time taken for
the remote server to respond to several TCP SYN
packets. To account for jitter and other short-lived
network conditions, the script collects 19 samples
over a five minute period for each website to allow us
to compare the averages between attack conditions.
We created a list of 40 domains from several dis-
tinct geographic locations, including the US, India,
the United Kingdom, Europe, and Japan, that make
use of SSL. We then established a baseline for round-
trip time (RTT) and certificate generation time for
each of these sites by running the script without an
MiTM attack.
To analyze the behavior under MiTM attack con-
ditions, we tested it against three popular software
packages that have SSL man-in-the-middle capabil-
ities. These packages are WebMiTM [5], Cain &
Abel [3], and Ettercap[4].
Results
Figure 2 shows the average RTT and certificate gen-
eration times for each of the 40 measured sites. ”cer-
tificate generation times” in the context of this paper
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Figure 2: Baseline Graph
The average RTTs
is the estimated time it takes the server send out
the certificate from when it receives the ClientHello
message.
After examining the different timing profiles for
each site, there didn’t appear to be an observable
trend across all of the websites. This is likely caused
by the wide variety of web server software and how
each handles certificate caching, connection queuing,
and crypto computations in general. All of the sites
we chose were high profile websites that could have
a wide variation of loads. Additionally, it’s possible
for the higher security profile sites (e.g. banks) to
be using an SSL proxy to protect their servers from
attacks. Therefore, at this point we don’t have a
true negative identification method for SSL MiTM
attacks.
Ettercap
Figure 3 shows the average RTT and certificate times
for the websites while the test server was victim to
an Ettercap ARP poisoning MiTM attack. Nearly
all of the delay has been shifted from RTT to the
certificate time. To illustrate it better, figure 4 shows
a logarithmic scale of the same chart. For all of the
sites, the cert time was at least an order of magnitude
more than the RTT time.
We also observed that Ettercap revealed itself in a
non-timing related manner. It accept HTTPS con-
nections and allow the ClientHello before sending a
RST when a client tries to connect to a non-HTTPS
enabled website. So, a simple tool could detect Etter-
cap MiTM attacks by attempting to establish a TCP
connection to port 443 on a server that doesn’t ac-
cept connections on that port, in which case Ettercap
would accept the connection anyway.
WebMiTM
WebMiTM is different from Ettercap and Cain &
Abel in that it is only designed to handle DNS-based
man-in-the-middle attacks. It expects there to be
a rogue DNS server directing traffic to it. In DNS
MiTM based attacks, there isn’t a way to deter-
mine which server an incoming TCP connection had
originally intended to connect to. WebMiTM com-
pensates for this by reading the server name identifier
in the ClientHello. A client could then test for its
presence by sending sites that shouldn’t be on the
same server in the SNI field to see if the correspond-
ing HTTP content comes back (i.e. a single SSL
server shouldn’t accept SSL connections and return
the correct page for google.com and bing.com).
In any DNS-based SSL MiTM attacks, a client can
detect catch-all attacks (i.e. ones that intercept all
traffic) with the same method described for Ettercap,
since they have to accept SSL conections to get the
SNI from the ClientHello.
From a timing perspective, WebMiTM isn’t very
interesting (figure 5). There is almost no variance
in the RTT or the cert time, but this is caused by a
major limitation of WebMiTM. It doesn’t dynami-
cally generate certificates to impersonate the correct
website, instead it just uses one provided certificate
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Figure 3: Ettercap
Figure 4: Ettercap Logarithmic Scale
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Figure 5: WebMiTM
for all of the connections.
Cain & Abel
Cain & Abel performs ARP poisoning man-in-the-
middle attacks on SSL sessions and can be configured
to utilize a user-provided certificate to sign all of the
certificates it generates for the web-servers that it
impersonates. So, if an attacker obtains a trusted
CA signing certificate and private key, it can be used
here for ”PKI-valid” attacks with a ’point-and-click’
interface.
Figure 6 shows the average RTT and certificate
generation times for 20 of the sites when Cain &
Abel was used to conduct an ARP poisoning man-in-
the-middle attack on the test machine. The average
RTTs here are much lower; however, there was still
a higher variance than we expected.
This variance is caused by the way that Cain &
Abel handles its certificate generation. It only ap-
pears to intercept a connection once it has listened
to a normal handshake to extract the certificate and
then generate and sign its own copy. Therefore, if a
site hasn’t been connected to before, the first SSL
connection is allowed to go through using its normal
certificate. This behavior was exacerbated by our
program closing the connection during the middle
of the handshake which seemed to interrupt Cain &
Abel’s process because it took it several connections
to generate a certificate for some of the websites.
Figure 8 and figure 7 illustrate this behavior by
showing the individual results from each test. The
RTT for a site significantly declines and its cert time
increases once Cain & Abel successfully impersonates
it.
We adjusted for this behavior by only measuring
the times of the MiTM responses once Cain & Abel
actually starts intercepting the SSL connections. Fig-
ure 9 shows the times with this adjustment made.
This matches the results received from Ettercap, a
low RTT time/variance between sites and a relatively
high cert time/variance between sites.
An important distinction between Cain & Abel
and the other two programs is how it handles con-
nection requests. It directly mimics the server it’s
impersonating. This is important to consider when
trying to be a completely transparent MiTM. For
example, if a user knows that exmaple.org does not
listen for HTTPS connections on port 443, a connec-
tion attempt to port 443 should yield a TCP RST or
a timeout. Cain & Abel is the only one that correctly
does this.
The only way we found that Cain & Abel could
be revealed (other than through timing analysis) is
by monitoring certificate changes. Due to its passive
behavior of allowing normal SSL connections until
a certificate is generated, a user could connect to
an arbitrary HTTPS site and then connect again a
few seconds later to watch for fingerprint changes in
the certificate. This method is still limited because
there is the possibility that Cain & Abel could have
already observed a connection to that same site and
generated a certificate for it.
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Figure 6: Cain & Abel RTT and Cert Time Averages
Figure 7: Cain & Abel Certificate Times for Individual Sites
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Figure 8: Cain & Abel RTT Times for Individual Sites
Figure 9: Cain & Abel RTT and Cert Time Averages (Only After Impersonation)
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Discussions/Future Work
In our experiment, we illustrated timing differences
inside an SSL handshake that occur during a man-in-
the-middle attack. The key indicator in our results
was the low RTT variance between websites. If the
MiTM attacker is several hundred milliseconds away,
the variance may increase to the point where it’s no
longer discriminating. To make our results more gen-
eralizable, future work would analyze various delays
to the attacker and statistically define boundaries
that identify an attack.
Related Work
Detecting Attacks through Traffic Behavior
Wagoner[13] performed a similar analysis with the
same goal of our project. However, his experimen-
tal design did not measure the internal timing of
the handshake process leading to less generalizable
results since just start-to-finish time was measured.
The experiment was run on a local network where
network delays were negligible, making any findings
impossible to generalize to high latency variance net-
works like the Internet. For example, he observed
an increase from <10ms to ≈250ms with the MiTM
tool he selected, which was the basis for his entire
statistical analysis and we saw variations of up to
300ms just based on server location when measuring
websites.
DTRAB[9] is a system that looks for anomolies
in secure protocols to identify out-of-characteristic
packets. It supports any protocol because it uses a
machine learning approach to build profiles on inter-
packet timing, payload sizes, flow sizes, etc. However,
it wouldn’t help against SSL MiTM attacks because
the SSL flows would look the same as regular SSL
traffic to their passive observation points.
There are several other works that use timing
analysis to link traffic to a source such as the research
conducted by Wang et al. [14], which correlates
encrypted traffic relayed through multiple hops (e.g.
SSH) to identify the source of traffic. Similarily,
Abraham et al. [6] presented timing attacks on low-
latency mixing networks (e.g. Tor) to de-anonymize
users.
To our knowledge, ours is the only work that ex-
amines the timing within an SSL/TLS handshake to
detect SSL/TLS MiTM attacks.
Additional Certificate Verification
Mechanisms
Another approach to detecting man-in-the-middle
attacks is to perform additional verifications on the
certificate received from the web server. These meth-
ods offer verifications that are difficult for a man-in-
the-middle attack to circumvent.
Certlock [11] employs a trust-of-first-use solution
similar to the way SSH keys are handled. On con-
necting to an SSL site, the certificate is cached. If a
different certificate is received on future connections,
the certificate authority is checked against the cached
copy. If the CA is from the same country, a warning
is not issued. This criteria was chosen in response to
sponsored eavesdropping by foreign countries. For
example, an Iranian CA might be pressured by its
government to issue a CA for gmail.com so they can
read the email contents of network users. The issue
with this approach is that an normal connection to
the web server must be made to cache the certificate
before it can detect attacks, which won’t work in
environments where MiTM attacks are persistent.
Perspectives[15], SignatureCheck[8] and
DoubleCheck[7] are methods of checking a re-
ceived certificate using a side-channel. All of them
use a PKI independent of the one trusted by the
browser to establish a connection with third-party
observation servers to request the thumbprints for
a given web-site. Perspectives provides historically
observed thumbprints from other clients, which
results in false positives if a server recently changed
its certificate. SignatureCheck connects to the
web-server in question to get the thumbprints at the
time of the request, which results in false negatives
if the web-server in question is the victim of the
man-in-the-middle attack rather than the client.
DoubleCheck is similar to SignatureCheck, but it
uses Tor for retrieval.
Conclusion
Our experiment revealed that SSL MiTM attacks
have timing patterns that could be identified by ob-
serving victims. More specifically, the attack tools
we analyzed shifted most of the delay to the time
between when an SSL handshake was started and
when the certificate was received. Additionally, most
of the variance in the RTT was eliminated when con-
necting to sites all over the world due to the MiTM
programs accepting TCP connections immediately.
We also presented non-timing based methods to re-
veal when the specific MiTM tools we tested were
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being used.
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